While government is the object that fiscal theorists examine, the history of public finance reveals two distinct orientations toward that examination. One orientation treats the state as autonomous from or independent of economic processes and institutions. The other orientation treats the state and the economy as interdependent and mutually generated. We describe these orientations as Anglo-Saxon and Continental respectively, out of recognition of the geographical loci where these orientations took shape in the late 19 th century. We also note that since the mid-20 th century much of the Continental orientation has been pursued under the rubric of public choice rather than public finance. In this way, the state sponsored economic development perspective of cameralist public finance (including Wicksell (1898)) got lost in the transmutation of public finance into public choice.
in the late-19 th century, and close by noting how the development of public choice in the second half of the 20 th century is really a continuation of the Continental orientation toward public finance.
A Complaint and a Quarrel: Framing the Disjunction
In his 1896 treatise on public finance, Knut Wicksell complained that the theory of public finance "seems to have retained the assumptions of its infancy, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when absolute power ruled almost all Europe (1958, p, 82) ." Absolute power is the possession of an autonomous ruler or state. Such a state might be ruthlessly despotic or it might be relatively benevolent, but it will be autonomous in any case. Sacrifice theories of taxation can be construed in this setting as recipes for the practice of benevolence toward ruled subjects. Wicksell argued that under parliamentary democracies it made no sense to regard subjects as being ruled, for they participated in their own governance through parliamentary institutions. For Wicksell, the challenge to fiscal theorizing was to map the contours of such governance when government was not an agent of intervention into market-generated economic relationships, but rather was an arena in which people participated in their own governance.
What resulted was political economy conceptualized as a seamless garment. 
Cameralist Origins of Continental Public Finance
As a field of systematic academic inquiry, public finance arose with the cameralists in central Europe in the 16 th century, as surveyed in Dittrich (1974) and Small (1909) . Joseph Schumpeter (1954, pp. 143-208) described the cameralists well when he referred to them as "Consultant Administrators." They were both consultants and administrators. They were consultants to the various kings, princes, and other royal personages who ruled throughout those lands.
The term cameralist derives from camera or kammer, and refers to the room or chamber where the councellors to the king or prince gathered to do their work.
The cameralists were not, however, anything like contemporary academic consultants. They were real-world administrators who were engaged in such activities as managing mines or glass works, as well as holding academic posts.
Johnann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-71) is a good case in point. When he was appointed in Vienna, he was appointed in two capacities. On the one hand, he was to give lectures (in political rhetoric) at the Theresianum, a school the queen and empress had founded for the purpose of training future civil servants.
Secondly, he was appointed a superintendent of mines. Hence, he prepared two inaugural lectures to be delivered in front of the empress. One lecture outlined what would become his entire rather complex system of cameralism and public administration, and which is presented in Backhaus and Reinert (forthcoming).
The other lecture treated the organization of mines.
While cameralism has sometimes been described as a Germanic version of mercantalism, the differences between them are surely more notable than the similarities. Both originated within authoritarian political regimes, and represented efforts to give good counsel to the heads of those regimes.
Mercantilism arose among big players on the international stage: the English, the French, the Spanish, and the Dutch. The ability of these powers to reach throughout the world to influence events and terms of trade provided the background for mercantilist thought and practice. The stress upon taxation and the prevalence of rent-seeking and other forms of venality were products of the big-player standing of the mercantile empires.
In contrast, cameralism arose under conditions of high political fragmentation. The cameralist lands were necessarily price takers on the international scene. There was no concern within the cameralist lands about influencing terms of trade, about the use of colonies as instruments of policy, and about one's relative standing among the preponderant powers. The focal point of cameralist concern was on survival of the regime. Survival required a military capacity and economic development, which in turn required the acquisition of improved technologies, the improvement of human capital, the creation of new enterprises, and the growth of population.
This concern about development took place within regimes that were both absolutist and severely constrained. The prince was the ruler of his lands, and he could hope to pass his principality along to his eldest son. His ability to do this, however, varied directly with the extent of economic progress within his land. A prince whose land was supporting a growing population of energetic and enterprising subjects would both be wealthier and face better survival prospects than a prince of a land where the population was stagnant or declining, and whose subjects were dull and lethargic. Furthermore, population was mobile in fact, even if it was mostly tied to the land at law through feudal restrictions.
Distances between lands were typically short. A peasant who traveled to a new land was not likely to be returned. In fact, it was the common law at the time that after a year plus a day, a peasant who had left the land and stayed in a city would be granted citizen's rights there. The rulers of the cameralist lands faced a competitive labor market. Indeed, the cameralist lands represented a kind of competitive industry among localized governments, much as Tiebout (1956) tried to characterize some 300 years later.
Cameralist public finance treated state lands and enterprises as principal sources of revenue; taxes were a distinctly secondary source. If one were to construct a model of the cameralist vision of the state, it would look like a model of a business firm. The state's lands were potential sources of revenue.
Forests 3 could be harvested, game could be caught, and mines could be built and worked. The prince would also sponsor an assortment of commercial enterprises, including such things as the operation of a glassworks or a brewery.
Taxes occupied only a secondary position as a source of revenue. Even in the late-19 th century, enterprise revenues and not taxes were the primary source of state revenue in the formerly cameralist lands (Backhaus and Wagner 1987) .
The cameralists' general predisposition against taxation as an instrument of public finance reflects an orientation that the state acts as a participant within the economic order. Individuals had their property and the state had its property.
The state should be able to use its property to generate the revenues required to finance its activities. Or at least those enterprise revenues should support the major portion of state activity. Some of the cameralists argued that taxes should be earmarked for the support of the military, while all activities concerned with internal development should be financed from the prince's net commercial revenues. In any case, a state contains many business enterprises within its boundaries, and with the state itself operating a subset of those enterprises. It was understood that the state would have significant expenses associated with its activities. These expenses, however, were not to become drains upon the private means of subjects. They were to be met from the lands and enterprises that constituted the state's property. For instance, in order to achieve a particular objective in a sustainable way it was rather common to assign a revenue source such as a vineyard to a public hospital.
Revenues, of course, are only one side of the fiscal account. The cameralists also devoted much thought to the expenditure side. Much of that discussion had a kind of capital-theoretic quality to it, where programs of expenditure today would generate increased revenue tomorrow. A great deal of the cameralist emphasis was placed on what is now called human capital, though it would not be appropriate to import too much of a conceptual framework into the cameralist writings. A good deal of this emphasis stemmed from the concern with population. A growing population was desirable, to be sure, but that population in turn had to possess useful skills and talents, to be healthy, and to possess an industrious attitude.
From Cameralism to Continental Public Finance
In both the cameralist and the mercantilist lands, the material of public finance was conceptualized in choice-theoretic terms. While the rulers of the mercantilist empires faced different opportunities and constraints than did the rulers of the cameralist lands, the phenomena of public finance were the products of ruler's choices in both settings. 
A Quick Excursion into Continental Public Finance
In this section we shall describe briefly a few examples from continental public finance to illustrate our claim about a common orientation across national boundaries. That orientation centered on the desire to render sensible the fiscal activities of states within a framework of mutual determination of polity and economy. In this section, we shall treat briefly some selected figures who contributed to Continental public finance. Our purpose here is twofold. On the one hand, we seek to characterize the general, commonly held orientation toward public finance. On the other hand, we seek to illustrate some of the differences of analytical detail that found expression within this commonly shared orientation. Hence, we shall first consider some of the seminal Italian contributions, after which we move to the northern end of the continent to examine Knut Wicksell, and then finish our excursion in the center of the continent by examining some German and Austrian contributions.
Italian Fiscal Scholarship. The period roughly bounded by 1880 and 1940 was one of great flourishing for Italian scholarship on public finance. 6 The Italian scholars treated public finance not just as one specialized field among several within economics, but as an independent object of study, partly in economics but also concerned with politics, law, and administration as well.
Central to their analytical framework was the incorporation of the state into the economic process, along with the universal application of such economic categories as utility and profit across all organizational arrangements within society.
For instance, the ability of political enterprises to expand will depend on their ability to attract patronage. They might attract that patronage through their ability to exploit economies of scale or to provide services that people are willing to support, but which were somehow not being otherwise provided. 7 This would correspond to standard formulations of public goods theory. They might also attract patronage through subsidizing supporters at the expense of other, less influential members of society, as noted with particular clarity in Giovanni The Italian tradition in public finance was soberly realistic. Whether people will support market or state provision of particular services will depend on which source of supply is less expensive to them. State provision may be cheaper for some people while being more expensive for others. If so, divisions of opinion will exist, with the outcome to be resolved through the exercise of political power as this is channeled and organized within some particular political framework. Whether the resulting outcomes are thought to be beautiful or ugly when appraised against some normative standard is beside the point. Wicksell's particular institutional interest was his effort to describe a network of institutional relationships that would make it possible for people in their capacities as taxpayers reasonably to say that their tax payments were directed as they wished. The ability for people to say this would locate government on the same plane as other economic participants. Wicksell assumed that through proportional representation it would be possible to select a parliament that would serve reasonably well as a miniature model of the Swedish population. If this parliament were then bound by a rule of unanimity, its decisions would conform closely to unanimity within the underlying population.
The state would participate within the economic process on the same terms as other participants. Its size relative to that of other organizations in society would depend on the effectiveness of its officers in gaining acceptance for proposals in parliament, relative to the ability of other producers to gain favor from people.
Wicksell articulated a principle of unanimity, which he relaxed to a practical rule of approximate unanimity. Wicksell recognized that this shift to approximate unanimity involved the creation of a tradeoff. True unanimity would ensure that people would not have to pay taxes for activities they were not willing to support. But it would also prove costly to any effort of trying truly to work out arrangements for collective support. Some modest movement away from unanimity might, Wicksell thought, be a reasonable compromise to expediency.
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) subsequently converted this compromise to expediency into a framework for constitutional analysis, and which can be traced through to the contemporary scholarship on public choice and constitutional economics, as Richard Wagner (1988) Foldvary (1994) and Spencer MacCallum (1970) explain, it is the same for hotels, shopping centers, and other forms of privately organized community. For instance, a hotel offers a tied sale of a room and such public goods as security services, elevator transit, and park-like amenities. Those public goods increase the demand for residency within the hotel, which is expressed through a higher price that residents are willing to pay. (Hettich and Winer 1999, Coughlin and Nitzan 1981) , democratic efficiency (Wittman 1995 , Becker 1983 , and incremental budgeting (Wildavsky 1984 , Kraan 1996 . Amilcare Puviani's (1903) work on fiscal illusion has never been translated into English, though Buchanan (1967, pp. 126-43) to the present, only it has undergone a change in name in the postwar period, from public finance to public choice.
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